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Pillow Talk, Grimgribbers and Connubial Bliss:
The Marital Communication Privilege
The rule that all relevant evidence is admissible at trial is a "presup-
position involved in the very conception of a rational system of
evidence."' Such a rule allows all relevant facts to be presented to the
factfinder in litigation-a prerequisite for the effective search for truth
in an adversary system of justice.2 Without such full disclosure "[t]he
very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the
system" would be impaired.' Consequently, "the public ... has a right to
every man's evidence."4
The rules of evidence which regulate the admission of facts may be
divided into two categories: rules of exclusion and rules of privilege.'
Rules of exclusion serve one of several functions. Some prevent the in-
troduction of irrelevant facts which would do little to facilitate the fact-
finding process.' Others exclude relevant facts whose potential for prej-
udicing the factfinder is found to outweigh their relevance.7 Still other
exclusionary rules prevent the introduction of unreliable evidence
While the exclusionary rules are designed to facilitate the truth
I J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 264-65 (1898)
(speaking of the need to exclude all irrelevant evidence); accord, In re Richardson, 31 N.J.
391, 401, 157 A.2d 695, 701 (1960); Morgan, Some Observations Concerning a Model Code of
Evidence, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 145 (1940); cf. FED. R. EvID. 402 (all relevant evidence to be ad-
mitted unless otherwise provided).
2 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); accord, Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 93-94 (1964) (White, J., concurring); Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d
1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977); Morgan, supra note 1, at 145.
3 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
1 12 COBBETT'S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY 693 (1742) (Hardwicke, L.C.), quoted in 8 J.
WIGMORE. EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2192, at 71 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton 1961).
Although this expression is often attributed to Wigmore, see, e.g., Comment, The Child-
Parent Privilege: A Proposal, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 771, 771 n.3 (1979) (citing 8 J. WIGMORE,
supra, § 2192, at 70), the expression was originated by Lord Chancellor Hardwicke in the
eighteenth century, see Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961).
' See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 72 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972);
Barnhart, Theory of Testimonial Competency and Privilege, 4 ARK L. REV. 377 (1950); Mc-
Cormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEx. L. REV. 447, 447-48 (1938).
' Barnhart, supra note 5, at 377; Morgan, supra note 1, at 154; see, e.g., FED. R. EVID.
402 (irrelevant evidence inadmissible).
7 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (relevant evidence to be excluded if its probative effect is
less than its prejudicial impact).
a C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 72; Barnhart, supra note 5, at 377; see, e.g., FED. R.
EvID. 701 (limiting the type of opinion testimony allowed to be given by a lay witness); id.
802 (hearsay generally inadmissible).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
gathering process,9 the rules of privilege frustrate it.'0 The function of
privileges is to foster or safeguard certain relationships or interests
which are considered so important that their protection justifies the ex-
clusion of facts from evidence which are both reliable and relevant."
One of the most prevalent of such rules is the marital privilege; all
American jurisdictions have some form of privilege or disqualification
restricting the admissibility of spousal testimony." The most common,"3
and least criticized," of these is the marital communication privilege.
' C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 72; Barnhart, supra note 5, at 377; McCormick, supra'
note 5, at 447; Comment, From the Mouths of Babes: Does the Constitutional Right of
Privacy Mandate a Parent-Child Privilege?, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1002, 1004; Note,
Testimonial Privilege and Competency in Indiana, 27 IND. L.J. 256, 256-57 (1951).
" See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5,_§§ 72, 86; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, at § 2192(3);
Barnhart, supra note 5, at 377-78; Comment, supra note 9, at 1004; Comment, supra note 4,
at 772; Note, supra note 9, at 257.
"' Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275,280 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ("The benefit of preserving...
confidences inviolate overbalances the possible benefit of permitting litigation to prosper at
the expense of the tranquility of the home, the integrity of the professional relationship,
and the spiritual rehabilitation of a penitent.") (Fahy, J., concurring); accord, Baird v.
Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1960) (attorney-client privilege); Shepherd v. State,
257 Ind. 229, 231-32, 277 N.E.2d 165, 168 (1971) (marital communication privilege); In re
Richardson, 31 N.J. 391, 396, 157 A.2d 695, 701 (1960) (attorney-client privilege); C. McCoR-
MICK. supra note 5, § 72; Barnhart, supra note 5, at 378; Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Pro-
fessions and the Law of Privileged Communications, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 609, 609-10 (1964);
Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEo. L.J. 61, 65 (1973); Morgan, supra note 1, at 150; Reut-
linger, Policy, Privacy, and Prerogatives: A Critical Examination of the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence as They Affect Marital Privileges, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1353, 1360 (1973);
Note, supra note 9, at 257; see Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion..
Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 110-11 (1956); cf. Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1980) (privilege for anti-marital facts; discussing the need for a
privilege to promote a public good in order to be justified).
Some statutes which set out the privileges expressly state the policy considerations that
prompted the legislation. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(1) (1973).
A privilege may serve to protect or foster a relationship in several ways. Privileges
may be used to both safeguard the privacy of the relationship immediately involved in the
litigation, Arnold v. State, 353 So. 2d 524, 526 (Ala. 1977); Krattenmaker, supra, at 85-94;
Comment, supra note 4, at 772, and foster the relationship by encouraging communication
within it, People v. Shapiro, 308 N.Y. 453, 458-59, 126 N.E.2d 559, 561-62 (1955). Note, The
Marital Testimony and Communications Privileges: Improvements and Uncertainties in
California and Federal Courts, 9 U.C.D. L. REV. 569, 594 (1976). Privileges may also prevent
the dissension within the relationship that is likely to arise if one of the participants revealed
certain information without the consent of the other. See text accompanying note 25 infra.
12 Comment, Husband-Wife Evidentiary Privileges: The Power of the Federal Courts to
Seek a Rational Solution, 17 ST. Louis U.L. REV. 107, 107 (1972). For a list of statutes codify-
ing the marital privileges, see 2 J. WIGMORE. EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 488
(rev. ed. J. Chadbourn 1979).
" Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 544 n.6 (1978); Reutlinger, supra note 11, at 1391;
Note, The Husband-Wife Privileges of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 208,
216 (1961); see Comment, supra note 12, at 108 n.4.
1" See, e.g., 8 J. WIGMORE. supra note 4, at §§ 2228, 2332 (condemning the privilege for
anti-marital facts as "illogical and unfounded" while advocating the retention of the marital
communication privilege); Orfield, The Husband-Wife Privileges in Federal Criminal Pro-
cedure, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 144 (1963) (suggesting the abolition of the privilege for anti-marital
facts while defending the marital communication privilege); Comment, Evidentiary
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This note will discuss the marital communication privilege as it is ap-
plied in most jurisdictions, and will demonstrate that the privilege is
more of a hindrance to the efficient administration of justice than an ef-
fective device safeguarding the institution of marriage. The possibility
that the constitutional right of privacy mandates limited protection for
certain marital communications will then be considered. Finally, a new
and narrower marital communication privilege will be outlined which
comports with constitutional guarantees of privacy while allowing the
admission of most relevant evidence.
THE MARITAL COMMUNICATION PRIVILEGE
Precursors of the Privilege
The first" evidentiary rule governing spousal testimony at common
law was the disqualification of parties' spouses as witnesses either for
or against the litigant spouse."6 This spousal incompetency was the pro-
duct of both the common law disqualification of parties from testifying
in their own causes 17 and the concept that husband and wife were one;6
Privileges and Incompetencies of Husband and Wife, 4 ARK. L. REV. 426, 432 (1950) (describ-
ing the marital communication privilege as sound while suggesting that the anti-marital
fact privilege and the incompetency be abolished). But see Proposed Federal Rule of
Evidence 505, 56 F.R.D. 244 (1972) (proposing only a privilege for anti-marital facts in
criminal cases while disposing of the marital communication privilege in its entirety).
"I The origins of the marital privileges are obscure, thus raising questions as to whether
the marital incompetency preceded the privilege for anti-marital facts. Wigmore contended
that the latter was first, having been recognized in Bent v. Allot, 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (1579),
while the incompetency was first mentioned by Lord Coke in 1 E. COKE, THE FIRST OF THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 6b (London 1628). 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, at §
2227. This assertion, however, has been contested. See, e.g., 1 E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS
OF EVIDENCE 43 (1954). Whichever rule restricting spousal testimony actually developed
first, most commentators address incompetency first for ease of discussion. See, e.g., Or-
field, supra note 14, at 144; Comment, supra note 13, at 208-09.
18 C. MCCORMICK. supra note 5, at § 66; 2 J. WIGMORE. supra note 12, §§ 600-620; Note,
supra note 13, at 208; Comment, supra note 12, at 108. An early example of this may be
found in Mary Grigg's Case, 83 Eng. Rep. 1 (K.B. 1666). But see 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note
12, § 600 (spousal incompetency precludes only testimony favorable to litigant spouse).
A second rule of marital incompetency was the so-called "Lord Mansfield's Rule" which
prohibited a parent from testifying to nonaccess if the testimony would tend to bastardize a
child born in wedlock. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 67; 7 J. WIGMORE, A
TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§
2063-2064 (3d ed. 1940).
", Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*443; C. MCCORMICK. supra note 5, § 66; 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 601; Note, supra
note 13, at 208; Comment, supra note 12, at 108-09.
" Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43-44 (1980); 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, §
601; Reutlinger, supra note 11, at 1363; Comment, supra note 12, at 108-09. This rationale
for the spousal incompetency was first advanced by Lord Coke in 1 E. COKE, supra note 15,
at 6b. The idea of man and wife being one is far older, however, having been advanced in
the Bible: "A man shall leave father and mother and shall cleave to his wife and they twain
shall be one flesh." A. SKOLNICK. THE INTIMATE ENVIRONMENT 212 (1973) (quoting Genesis
2:24).
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because of the unity of spouses, the wife shared her husband's dis-
qualification as an interested party. 19 Spousal incompetency has,
however, been either abolished" or limited by judicial decision2' in most
jurisdictions.
The second rule restricting spousal testimony was the privilege allow-
ing a litigant to prevent his' spouse from testifying against him." This
" 2 J. WIGMORE. supra note 12, §§ 575, 600.
In later years, however, the spousal incompetency was justified by a more modern argu-
ment that it prevented the dissension that would arise if a wife were to testify against her
husband. 2 J. WIGMORE. supra note 12, § 601; Comment, Questioning the Marital Privilege:
A Medieval Philosophy in a Modern World, 7 CUM. L. REV. 307, 308 (1976). However, once
that rationale was adopted the incompetency was likely to evolve into what was in effect a
privilege for anti-marital facts, see, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-44-4 (1978) (repealed 1980)
(spouses incompetent to testify in criminal trials unless the other consents); for if the pur-
pose were only to prevent dissension, there would be no need to keep the wife from testify-
ingfor her husband. Cf. 2 J. WIGMORE. supra note 12, § 600 (contending that the spousal in-
competency prohibited only testimony for the party spouse and that the privilege for anti-
marital facts prevented adverse testimony).
Although the Indiana statute, IND. CODE § 34-1-14-5 (1978), provides that husband and
wife are "incompetent" to testify concerning marital communications, the Indiana Supreme
Court has construed that statute as mandating only a privilege, thus allowing waiver.
Bergner v. State, - Ind. App. -, . n.5, 397 N.E.2d 1012, 1019 n.5 (1979); Shepherd
v. State, 257 Ind. 229, 231, 277 N.E.2d 165, 166 (1972); Hunt v. State, 235 Ind. 276, 133
N.E.2d 48 (1956); cf. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wiler, 100 Ind. 92, 100 (1885) (similar
holding concerning doctor-patient communications). But see Note, supra note 9, at 258-59
(detailing the history of inconsistent holdings by the Indiana courts on whether the statute
provides for a privilege or an incompetency). A similar situation exists in Maine. See State
v. Smith, 384 A.2d 687, 689 (Me. 1978); State v. Benner, 284 A.2d 91, 109 (Me. 1977); 15
M.R.S.A. § 1315 (1976).
Courts and legislatures often confuse the two concepts of privilege and incompetency.
Reutlinger, supra note 11, at 1363; Comment, supra, at 309; see, e.g., Lutwak v. United
States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953) (speaking of an incompetency to testify against a spouse
although spousal incompetency had been abolished in Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371
(1935)); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-44-4 (1978) (repealed 1980) (spouses incompetent to testify
without the consent of the other spouse). An incompetency absolutely forbids testimony by
a spouse; the other spouse cannot choose whether to allow the testimony. Reutlinger, supra
note 11, at 1363. A privilege, on the other hand, allows the holder of the privilege to choose
whether the witness may testify. Id.
'2 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 45 (1980); C. McCoRMICK, supra note 5, § 66; 2
J. WIGMORE. supra note 12, § 602. For a list of statutes, see 2 J. WIGMORE. supra note 12, §
488.
21 See note 19 supra.
' For ease of discussion only, this note will assume that the wife is the witness and the
husband is the litigant.
23 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 66; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra -note 4, § 2234; Reutlinger,
supra note 11, at 1363; Note, supra note 13, at 210.
Although most states give the privilege either to the litigant spouse or to both spouses,
some states have given the privilege to the witness spouse alone. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §
12-21-227 (1975). For a list of statutes, see United States v. Trammel, 445 U.S. 40, 48-49 n.9
(1980); 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 488. This is consistent with the policy of the privilege
to prevent dissension in the marriage. See text accompanying note 25 infra. If the witness
spouse is willing to testify against the other, the marriage is already thought to be so
troubled that there is no harmony left to preserve. Reutlinger, supra note 11, at 1385;
Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEo. L.J. 125,
132 (1973). The same argument was recently advanced by the United States Supreme Court
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privilege for anti-marital facts 4 was considered effective in preventing
dissension between the litigant and his spouse.' In addition to preserv-
ing the harmony of marriages, the privilege for anti-marital facts was a
means to prevent what was thought to be the naturally repugnant spec-
tacle of a wife compelled to testify against her husband. Although this
privilege has been widely criticized,' it is still extant in many American
jurisdictions.'
in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980), as a basis for abolishing the federal
privilege for anti-marital facts. Id at 49. Compare id. with Hawkins v. United States, 358
U.S. 74 (1958).
"4 The expression "privilege for anti-marital facts" was coined by Dean Wigmore, see 8
J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2227, to emphasize that the privilege only affects adverse
testimony. Reutlinger, supra note 11, at 1363 n.35. Nevertheless, at least one state provides
a testimonial privilege protecting both testimony for and against the other spouse. See
ALA. CODE ANN. § 12-21-227 (1975) (giving the witness spouse a privilege not to testify for or
against the party spouse). But see 2 J. WIGMORE. supra note 12, § 60D.
" United States v. Trammel, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980); Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S.
74, 77 (1958); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2228; Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations
on the Law of Evidence: Family Relations, 13 MINN. L. REV. 675, 677 (1929); Reutlinger,
supra note 11, at 1359-60; Rothstein, supra note 23, at 132. This rationale has also been used
to support the spousal disqualification. See note 19 supra.
I Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77-79 (1958); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2228;
Reutlinger, supra note 11, at 1360; Note, supra note 13, at 210. Although the commentators
often speak of the repugnance felt in witnessing a spouse compelled to give testimony, see,
e.g., Reutlinger, supra note 11, at 1360, the witness spouse is often prevented from testify-
ing even when she is willing to do so, see, e.g., United States v. Trammel, 445 U.S. 40, 46
(1980); Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1958). This would tend to support the
giving of the privilege to the witness spouse; if the witness spouse is willing to. testify,
surely society should not find it as repugnant a spectacle. Reutlinger, supra note 11, at
1385; Rothstein, supra note 23, at 132.
It has also been suggested that the privilege served to protect the factfinder from the
perjured testimony that would be likely if a wife were compelled to testify against her hus-
band. See Note, supra note 13, at 210; cf. Louisell, supra note 11, at 109-10 (noting that this
is the primary reasoning behind the European marital privileges).
Jeremy Bentham contended that the reasons given in support of the privilege for anti-
marital facts were all counterfeit:
The reason now given, was not, I suspect the original one. Drawn from the
principle of utility, though from the principle of utility imperfectly applied, it
savours of a late and polished age. The reason that presents itself as more
likely to have been the original one, is the grimgribber, nonsensical reason,-
that of the identity of two persons thus connected. Baron and Feme are one
person in law. On questions relative to the two matrimonial conditions, this
quibble is the fountain of all reasoning.
5 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 344-45 (1827); accord, C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 5, § 66 (referring to the instant privilege as "an archaic survival of a mystical religious
dogma").
" Reutlinger, supra note 11, at 1381-82; see, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40
(1980); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2228(4); Note, supra note 13, at 230. Much of the
criticism has been directed at the fact that the privilege is not given to the witness spouse.
See, e.g., Reutlinger, supra note 11, at 1385.
2 Note, supra note 13, at 210; Comment, supra note 12, at 107. For a list of statutes codi-
fying the anti-marital fact privilege, see 2 J. WIGMORE. supra note 12, § 488.
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Aspects of the Marital Communication Privilege
The marital communication privilege first received statutory recogni-
tion in mid-nineteenth century England.' At this time there was
widespread criticism of the spousal incompetency and the privilege for
anti-marital facts rules which ultimately resulted in their abolition in
that country." Criticism of both rules focused on their rationales," and
continued to build as a result of the increasing independence of women.2
Although both legislatures and courts recognized the need to relax the
restrictions on spousal testimony, they were reluctant to require a
spouse to testify to information acquired independently of the marriage
as well as to that information known only as a result of the marital rela-
tionship." With the attorney-client privilege available as a paradigm,' a
communication privilege was fashioned which allowed an individual to
prevent his spouse from testifying concerning marital confidences, but
which did not allow the individual to prevent his spouse from testifying
with regard to information acquired outside of the marriage."
1 8 J. WIGMORE. supra note 4, § 2333. The privilege was adopted by American jurisdic-
tions soon after that time. Id. In some American jurisdictions there was no need for
statutory enactment because the courts held that the marital communication privilege had
been present at common law. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U.S. 342 (1897); Arnold v.
State, 353 So. 2d 524, 526 (Ala. 1977); Duonnolo v. State, 397 A.2d 126 (Del. 1978). The
English courts, however, have held that the privilege is a purely statutory creation. See,
e.g., Shenton v. Tyler, [1939] 1 Ch. 620; cf. Stapleton v. Crofts, 118 Eng. Rep. 137, 140 (Q.B.
1852) (holding that the rule giving protection to "conjugal confidence" as not yet established
in the common law).
0 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2333; Note, supra note 13, at 218.
"1 The most vehement of the detractors was Jeremy Bentham: "The privilege bases and
degrades the matrimonial union; converting into a sink of corruption what ought to be a
source of purity. It defiles the marriage contract itself, by tacking to it in secret a license to
commit crimes." 5 J. BENTHAM, supra note 26, at 343.
See, e.g., 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2228:
In an age which has so far rationalized, depolarized, and de-chivalrized the
marital relation and the spirit of Femininity as to be willing to enact complete
legal political equality and independence of man and woman, this marital
privilege is the merest anachronism, in legal theory, and an indefensible
obstruction to truth, in practice.
Accord, 1 S. SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND
DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 71 (6th ed. A. Blakemore 1921).
Note, supra note 13, at 218; see Comment, supra note 19, at 312.
u See Note, supra note 13, at 218.
, C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 78. Most American jurisdictions have a marital com-
munication privilege. See Comment, supra note 19, at 311 & n.28. For a list of statutes codi-
fying the privilege, see 2 J. WIGMORE. supra note 12, § 488.
The original English statute gave the privilege to the witness spouse: "No Husband shall
be compellable to disclose any Communication made to him by his Wife during the Mar-
riage and no Wife shall be compellable to disclose any Communication made to her by her
Husband during the Marriage." 16 & 17 Vict. c. 83 § 3 (1853). See generally notes 59-61 &
accompanying text infra.
The marital communication privilege is both narrower and broader than the privilege for
anti-marital facts. Unlike the latter privilege, the marital communication privilege does not
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The justification most frequently advanced for the marital com-
munication privilege is that it promotes marital confidences which in
turn foster stable marriages." This guarantee of secrecy for marital con-
fidences, it is argued, benefits marriages sufficiently to outweigh the
damage to the judicial process caused by the exclusion of evidence.37 A
second rationale, also used to support the privilege for anti-marital
facts," is that society finds it naturally repugnant to observe a wife be-
ing forced to reveal her husband's marital confidences on the witness
stand. 9
Although most statutes setting forth the marital communication
privilege refer to "communications" as being protected,"9 few actually
define the term.' As a result, the courts have had difficulty determining
bar merely testimony adverse to the litigant spouse. 8 J. WIGMORE. supra note 4, § 2333.
But see WIS. CODE § 905.05(1) (1978) (preventing only testimony concerning marital com-
munications which is to be used against the defendant spouse). The marital communication
privilege may be used to exclude testimony even though the holder spouse is not a litigant
and would not be adversely affected by the testimony. See note 64 & accompanying text in-
fra. The privilege for anti-marital facts is broader than the marital communication privilege
in that it prevents information adverse to the litigant spouse, regardless of the source of
the information, while the communication privilege protects only information received from
the other spouse due to the marital relationship. Id. For a discussion of exactly what type of
information is protected, see text accompanying notes 41-47 infra.
-, Mercer v. State, 40 Fla. 216, 226, 24 So. 154, i57 (1898): "Society has a deeply-rooted
interest in . . . the maintenance of the sacred institution of marriage; and its strongest
safeguard is to preserve with jealous care any violation of those hallowed confidences in-
herent in, and inseparable from, the marital status." Accord, Shepherd v. State, 257 Ind.
229, 232, 277 N.E.2d 165, 167 (1971); State v. Smith, 384 A.2d 687, 690 (Me. 1978); 8 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2332; Reutlinger, supra note 11, at 1358-59.
It should be emphasized that, unlike the privilege for anti-marital facts, the instant
privilege does not focus on the marriage of the parties involved in the litigation. Instead,
the marital communication privilege is intended to foster communication in marriages
generally; its protection of the immediate couple's privacy is merely incidental to its
broader purpose. Comment, supra note 4, at 777-78.
-1 Reutlinger, supra note 11, at 1360. But see 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2332 (ques-
tioning whether the benefit to marriages actually does outweigh the injury to society by
the incorrect disposal of litigation); Rothstein, supra note 23, at 131 (while the privilege may
not actually promote marital confidences, other policy justifications exist for its retention);
notes 104-21 & accompanying text infra.
See note 26 & accompanying text supra.
C . MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 86; Rothstein, supra note 23, at 131; Note, supra note
13, at 218-19. This rationale was first asserted for the communication privilege by the
English Common Law Commission in 1853: "[Tlhe alarm and unhappiness occasioned to
society by . . . compelling the public disclosures of confidential communications between
husband and wife would be a far greater evil than the disadvantage which may occasionally
arise from the loss of light which such revelations might throw on questions in dispute."
COMMON LAW COMMISSION, SECOND REPORT 13 (1853), quoted in 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4,
§ 2332. But see notes 122-26 & accompanying text infra.
40 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 78; see, e.g., CAL. EviD. CODE § 980 (1966); IND. CODE §
34-1-14-5 (1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(1) (Supp. 1980).
" C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 78; see, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE § 980 (1966); IND. CODE §
34-1-14-5 (1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(1) (Supp. 1980); S.C. CODE § 19-11-30 (1976).
1980]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
what constitutes a "communication"4 and the holdings on the issue have
been confused." Most commentators, however, agree that the policy of
encouraging confidences between spouses demands only that the
privilege apply to expressions or acts that were intended to convey in-
formation or to serve as substitutes for words." Despite such agree-
ment, many courts have extended the scope of the privilege to encom-
pass noncommunicative acts done in the presence of a spouse. Many
courts have achieved a similar result by holding that the privilege pro-
tects all information acquired as a result of the marital relationship. 6
A similar expansion has occurred in the determination of whether a
communication was intended to remain confidential. Although most
statutes expressly require confidentiality,47 or are so construed,48 the
courts have raised a presumption that all communications between
spouses satisfy that element. 9 This presumption may be rebutted by a
showing that the subject matter of the communication" or the cir-
42 1 E. MORGAN, supra note 15, at 92-93 (commenting that some of the decisions "shock
common sense"); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2337.
, State v. Smith, 384 A.2d 687, 690 .3 (Me. 1978); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 79; 1 E.
MORGAN, supra note 15, at 92-93; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2337.
" C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 79; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2337; accord, Pereira
v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1954); State v. Smith, 384 A.2d 687, 690 (Me. 1978); Grund-
strom v. State, 456 S.W.2d 92, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
45 Comment, supra note 13, at 115; see, e.g., Shepherd v. State, 257 Ind. 229, 277 N.E.2d
165 (1971); People v. Daghita, 299 N.Y. 194, 86 N.E.2d 172 (1949); Hanvy v. State, 215 Tenn.
322, 385 S.W.2d 752 (1965); Menefee v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 900, 55 S.E.2d 9 (1949).
" Note, supra note 14, at 222; see, e.g., Shepherd v. State, 257 Ind. 229, 277 N.E.2d 165
(1971) (participation in crime of burglary with wife driving getaway car was matter of con-
fidence and thus privileged); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Pierce's Adm'x, 270 Ky. 216, 219, 109
S.W.2d 616, 617 (1937) (communications included all knowledge acquired as a result of the
marriage; fact that wife saw the date of her husband's birth in the family Bible was privi-
leged).
This construction often prevents testimony concerning a spouse's mental or physical con-
dition as observed by the witness spouse. See, e.g., McFadden v. Welch, 177 Miss. 451, 170
So. 903 (1936) (mental state). Contra, Polson v. State, 137 Ind. 519, 35 N.E. 907 (1893)
(venereal disease).
", C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 80; see, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 980 (West 1966); N.Y.
CIV. PRAC. LAW § 4502(b) (McKinney 1963).
" C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 80; Note, supra note 13, at 222-23; see, e.g., Foss v.
State, 92 Nev. 163, 167, 547 P.2d 688, 691 (1976).
" C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 80; Note, supra note 13, at 223; see, e.g., Blau v. United
States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951); Smith v. State, 384 A.2d 687 (Me. 1978).
' The presumption of confidentiality does not apply to interspousal communications con-
cerning business matters. State v. Curtis, 334 S.W.2d 757, 763 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960); C. MC-
CORMICK, supra note 5, § 80. It has been argued that business matters are intended to
become publicly known at a later time and, therefore, it would be unfair for such communi-
cations to be excluded at trial. See id. It also has been argued that the disclosure of busi-
ness matters is not damaging to a marriage. See Sexton v. Sexton, 129 Iowa 487, 491-92, 105
N.W. 314, 316 (1905) (public policy demands their revelation). Some courts appear to feel
that business communications to one's spouse are not included in the definition of "marital
communications" at all. See, e.g., Brooks v. Brooks, 357 Mo. 343, 350, 208 S.W.2d 279, 283
(1948) ("[tlhe conversations . .. relate primarily to business matters, not marital confi-
dences...").
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cumstances surrounding it5 indicate that the communication was not in-
tended to remain confidential. The justification for this presumption is
that spouses typically exchange confidences casually, with few express
requests for secrecy.52 As a result, it is argued, intention would be dif-
ficult to establish and thus a presumption is necessary.5
The presence of third persons at the time of the communication will rebut the pre-
sumption of confidentiality. If the communicating spouse was aware of the third party, the
privilege fails entirely. In that event, both the witness spouse and the third person will be
allowed to testify. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954); Keyes v. State, 122 Ind. 527,
23 N.E. 1097 (1889); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 80; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2339.
Contra, State v. Sabin, 79 Wis. 2d 302, 255 N.W.2d 320 (1977). Nevertheless, if the third per-
son is a child of one of the spouses and is too young to understand the meaning of the com-
munication, the privilege will not fail. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 80; see, e.g., Hicks v.
Hicks, 271 N.C. 204, 155 S.E.2d 799 (1967) (presence of an eight year old child does not
destroy the privilege). But see Fuller v. Fuller, 100 W. Va. 309, 130 S.E. 270 (1925) (presence
of a 13 year old child causes the privilege to fail).
In addition, eavesdroppers are allowed to testify concerning confidences which were
overheard. United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986
(1973) (petition on privilege issue), rev'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 143 (1974); C. MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 5, § 82; Note, supra note 13, at 224. This spectacle of an eavesdropper
testifying concerning marital confidences would appear to be just as repugnant to society to
witness as the spectacle of a wife testifying voluntarily. Id. See generally notes 38-39 & ac-
companying text supra. Supporters justify the exception by arguing that, as in the attor-
ney-client privilege, the burden of ensuring privacy should be placed on the communicating
spouse. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 82; accord, Commonwealth v. Everson, 123 Ky. 330,
96 S.W. 460 (1907). Another justification is that the statutes often refer to only spousal
testimony as being privileged. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 82; see, e.g., IND. CODE §
34-1-14-5 (1978). Another possible argument is that, if the communicating spouse took no
precautions to ensure the inviolability of his confidences, he indicated his indifference to
disclosure and, thus, a lack of intent that the communication remain confidential. Neverthe-
less, with the recent advances in electronic surveillance technology it might be argued that,
if the spouse took all reasonable precautions, the testimony of the eavesdropper should not
be admitted. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 82. Contra, United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191
(7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973) (petition on privilege issue), rev'd on other
grounds, 415 U.S. 143 (1974) (wiretap recording of confidences admissible if the wiretap has
been properly authorized).
Finally, "constructive presence," when another person ontside of the marriage is also
made privy to the information conveyed between spouses, may be used to defeat the privi-
lege. Smith v. State, 384 A.2d 687, 692-93 (Me. 1978). Contra, Hipes v. United States, 603
F.2d 786, 788 n.1 (1979). Extrajudicial disclosure would certainly tend to indicate that the
requisite confidentiality of the communication did not exist. Nevertheless, one court has in-
dicated in dictum that a wife could not testify concerning her husband's employment, even
though such information was available to others outside the marriage. See id. at 788 n.1.
" Smith v. State, 384 A.2d 687, 691 (Me. 1978); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2336; Com-
ment, supra note 12, at 111 n.30.
" Smith v. State, 384 A.2d 687, 691 (Me. 1978); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2336. But
see notes 85-87 & accompanying text infra.
In Smith v. State, 384 A.2d 687 (Me. 1978), the Maine Supreme Court discussed the need
for confidentiality between the spouses to be an "actual inducing factor" of the communica-
tion or conduct, before such communication or conduct may be privileged:
Hence, if confidentiality confined to husband and wife has not been purpose-
fully and expressly sought or invoked, it must appear, as a minimally neces-
sary condition, that the spouse whose conduct or statement is sought to be
protected by claim of privilege must have acted in reliance upon an expec-
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Although the privilege has been expanded through determinations of
what constitutes a confidential communication, it has also been
restricted by the courts' liberal interpretations of the rights of waiver.
While the statutes often provide for waiver only by express consent,"
courts have held that failure to raise the privilege in a timely manner,'
voluntary courtroom revelation of a material part of the communica-
tion58 and extrajudicial disclosure of privileged matters57 constitute
waivers of the privilege.
Of course, only one who holds the privilege may waive it. 8 In accord-
ance with the policy of encouraging marital communications, the
privilege is often given to the communicating spouse.59 Some jurisdic-
tions, however, have ignored the policy and granted the privilege to the
communicatee 0 or to both spouses. 1 Whoever holds the privilege, it may
tancy, reasonable under all the circumstances, that [it] ... will be transmitted
only to the spouse and to no other person ....
Id. at 689 (emphasis omitted) (citing State v. Benner, 284 A.2d 91, 109 (Me. 1971)). Despite
such statements, the court nevertheless held that to force the holder of the privilege to
establish the intention that the communication remain confidential would be too heavy a
burden and would most likely result in the revelation of the confidences sought to be privi-
leged. Therefore, the court ruled that all marital communications were presumed to be con-
fidential. Id. at 691.
1, See, e.g., CAL. EviD. CODE §§ 912, 980 (West 1966); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2162
(1968); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.05 (West 1975).
" See, e.g., People v. Kroeger, 61 Cal. 2d 236, 390 P.2d 369, 37 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1964);
Richard v. State, 262 Ind. 534, 536, 319 N.E.2d 118, 120 (1974); Pendleton v. Pendleton, 103
Ohio App. 345, 145 N.E.2d 485 (1957). It has also been held that consent by the holder to the
interrogation of his spouse by investigators before trial constitutes waiver. Hunt v. State,
235 Ind. 276, 133 N.E.2d 48 (1956) (suspect told officer to "go ask my wife").
5, See, e.g., Driver v. Driver, 52 N.E. 401 (Ind. 1898); White v. State, 268 P.2d 310 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1954). In Fraser v. United States, 145 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 849 (1945), a party to litigation asserted the privilege but it was erroneously denied by
the trial court. After having been ordered by the court to testify, the party testified in
order to avoid contempt proceedings. The court of appeals held that he should have con-
tinued to refuse to testify and subjected himself to contempt proceedings. Any testimony,
the court reasoned, even if under court order, waived the privilege. 145 F.2d at 144
57 See, e.g., Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934); People v. Worthington, 38 Cal.
App. 3d 359, 113 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1974); Richard v. State, 262 Ind. 534, 536, 319 N.E.2d 118,
120 (1974). Courts sometimes refer to this as "constructive presence" and thus use it to
rebut the presumption of confidentiality, rather than describing it as a waiver of the privi-
lege. See note 51 supra.
" See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2340(2).
5 See, e.g., Fraser v. United States, 145 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S.
849 (1945); Dalton v. People, 68 Colo. 44, 189 P. 37 (1920); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 4502(t)
(McKinney 1963).
5' See, e.g., N.M. R. EVID. 505(c) (1980). This is consistent with the original formulation of
the privilege in England. See note 35 supra.
61 See, e.g., United States v. Trotter, 529 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1976); Hunter v. Hunter, 169
Pa. Super. Ct. 498, 83 A.2d 401 (1951); CAL. EVID. CODE § 980 (West 1966); N.Y. CIv. PRAC.
LAW § 4502(b) (McKinney 1963).
Some states do not determine the holder by reference to his role at the time of the com-
munication; rather, the holder is designated in terms of his role in the litigation. See, e.g.,
Worthington v. State, - Ind. App. - , 391 N.E.2d 1164 (1979) (the privilege belongs to
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be invoked regardless of whether the holder spouse is a party to the
litigation.2 In addition, the privilege may not be effectively asserted by
someone other than the holder spouse,"3 although courts have invoked it
to protect a holder who is not present at the hearing."
Although jurisdictions disagree on who should hold the marital com-
munication privilege, all require that a confidence be made during a
valid marriage before the privilege will apply. Nevertheless, once a
communication has been made during a valid marriage, it will remain
privileged despite the subsequent termination of the marriage by
divorce66 or by the death of one of the spouses. 7 This survival of the
privilege is premised on the assumption that confidences will not be suffi-
ciently encouraged unless the spouses are assured that their statements
will never be subjected to forced disclosure. 8
the defendant in a criminal trial); Hagedorn v. Hagedorn, 211 N.C. 175, 189 N.E. 507 (1937)
(the marital communication privilege belongs to the witness spouse); UTAH CODE ANN. §
77-1-6(2(d) (Supp. 1980) (a witness cannot be compelled to testify against spouse in a crimi-
nal case).
To define the holder as, for example, a defendant in a criminal case would appear to deny
a spouse the privilege in any other type of litigation. Unless courts decide that when the
statute is inapplicable, ie., when it is a civil case, the common law rules of the privilege ap-
ply, the effect of the privilege in encouraging marital communications is severely
restricted.
" Reutlinger, supra note 11, at 1364; Comment, supra note 4, at 777 n.47. This is because
the privilege is meant to protect marriages, and not merely the litig'ant's chance to win a
case. Martin v. State, 203 Miss. 187, 33 So. 2d 825 (1948); see note 36 supra. But see note 61
supra.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2340 n.2; Note, supra note 13, at 219-20.
Pace v. State, 61 Tex. Crim. 436, 438, 135 S.W. 379, 382 (1911) (reversing on other
grounds) (murder prosecution; trial court was correct in refusing to allow a widow to testify
that her deceased husband had confessed to the murder); accord, Coles v. Harsch, 129 Or.
11, 276 P. 248 (1929).
People v. Mabry, 71 Cal. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 655, 455 P.2d 759 (1969) (although defen-
dant had married the witness, because the marriage was illegal and void, the privilege did
not attach); Lane v. State, 266 Ind. 485, 364 N.E.2d 756 (1977) (couple which had lived
together for six years and which considered themselves to be married were not protected
by the marital communication privilege). Statements made before a marriage, or after a
divorce, do not come within the scope of the privilege. Volianitis v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 352 F.2d 766 (8th Cir. 1965) (only statement made during a marriage
protected by the privilege); Damrell v. State, 170 Ind. App. 256, 352 N.E.2d 855 (1976)
(statements made after a divorce not protected by the privilege).
" United States v. Termini, 267 F.2d 18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 822 (1959);
Pereira v. United States, 202 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1953), affd, 347 U.S. 1 (1954); Shepherd v.
State, 257 Ind. 229, 234, 277 N.E.2d 165, 168 (1972) (dictum); Perry v. Randall, 83 Ind. 143
(1882). Contra, UNIFORM RuLE OF EVIDENCE 28(1) (1953).
0 United States v. Burks, 470 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Stanley v. Montgomery, 102 Ind.
102, 26 N.E. 213 (1885); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 65 (1958); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §
4502 (McKinney 1963). Contra, UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 28(1) (1953).
The happiness of the married state requires that there should be the most
unlimited confidence between husband and wife; and this confidence the law
secures by providing that it shall be kept forever inviolable; that nothing shall
be extracted from the bosom of the wife which was confided there by the hus-
band.
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Although the privilege has no time limitations, certain classes of
litigation have been excluded from its purview. The most common ex-
ception is the prosecution of one spouse for crimes against the other. 9
This "necessity" exception" has been expanded to include litigation con-
cerning crimes by one spouse against the child of either.7 Other excep-
tions include actions for alienation of affection or criminal conversa-
tion,72 civil actions by one spouse against the other 3 and situations in
which the evidence is necessary to the criminal defense of one of the
spouses.74
FROM A DEN OF THIEVES BACK TO A CASTLE 75
In recent years there has been a tendency for codes of evidence to
1 S. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE 296 (13th ed. 1876), quoted in C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 85.
See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 85; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2341.
9 E.g., United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1949); Jordan v. State, 142 Ind.
422, 41 N.E. 817 (1895); State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 251 A.2d 442 (1969); CAL. EVID. CODE §
985 (West 1966); UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 28(2)(c) (1953).
" The necessity doctrine existed at common law for the two earlier rules governing
spousal testimony. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, *443. This exception was ap-
plicable only when the prosecuting spouse would suffer a great injustice if not allowed to
testify. Id. It was later adopted by the courts for use with the marital communication privi-
lege. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2239.
" See, e.g., People v. 0yola, 6 N.Y.2d 259, 160 N.E.2d 494 (1959); Commonwealth v.
Maroney, 414 Pa. 161, 199 A.2d 424 (1964); CAL. EVID. CODE § 985 (West 1966); UNIFORM
RULE OF EVIDENCE 28(2(c) (1953).
72 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 84; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2332(3); see, e.g., Jen-
nings v. Jennings, 193 Misc. 805, 84 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Sup. Ct. 1948). Contra, Kreager v.
Kreager, 192 Ind. 242, 135 N.E. 660 (1922).
"' C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 84; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2332(3); see, e.g.,
Poppe v. Poppe, 3 N.Y.2d 312, 165 N.Y.S.2d 99, 144 N.E.2d 72 (1956); CAL. EVID. CODE § 984
(West 1966). Contra, Tallent v. Tallent, 22 A.D.2d 988, 254 N.Y.S.2d 722 (1964).
"' See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 987 (West 1966); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 216(d)
(1942). Although both Wigmore and McCormick advocated this exception, see C. MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 5, § 84; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2332(4), it has not been adopted in
most states. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 84; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2332(4); see,
e.g., People v. Ernest, 306 Ill. 452, 138 N.E. 116 (1923) (husband charged with forging wife's
signature; not allowed to testify concerning her authorization). Whether this position would
survive a due process challenge, however, is uncertain.
A growing number of jurisdictions are beginning to recognize a new exception for com-
munications in furtherance of a crime. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373
(5th Cir. 1978); Cotroni v. United States, 527 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
906 (1976); United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986
(1973) (petition on privilege issue), rev'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 143 (1974); State v.
Smith, 384 A.2d 687 (Me. 1979); Gutridge v. State, 236 Md. 514, 204 A.2d 557 (1964); People
v. Watkins, 89 Misc. 2d 870, 393 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1977); CAL. EVID. CODE § 981 (West 1966);
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 217 (1942). Nevertheless, not all jurisdictions have accepted
the new exception, see, e.g., Shepherd v. State, 257 Ind. 229, 277 N.E.2d 165 (1971) (the fact
that, after a burglary, wife drove the getaway car for her husband was a privileged com-
munication), despite a similar exception to the attorney-client privilege, see generally C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 95; Gardner, The Crime or Fraud Exception to the Attorney-
Client Privilege, 47 A.B.A.J. 708 (1961).
75 [T]he law should strew danger before every step which it could occur to a man
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become more inclusory.7 8 This development has been complemented by a
trend in the courts to admit more information into evidence." The in-
creasing criticism of exclusionary rules was reflected in United States
v. Nixon:78 "Whatever their origin, these exceptions to the demand for
every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed,
for they are in derogation of the search for truth." 9 Notwithstanding
this trend, however, the marital communication privilege has emerged
relatively unscathed from recent attempts to limit its obstructive im-
pact on litigation." Efforts to create more exceptions to the privilege
have been resisted by both courts and legislatures." In addition, the
courts have been unwilling, or unable, to restrict the privilege's
perimeters to the minimum necessary to advance its underlying policy
of encouraging marital confidences.82
This general disinclination to limit the purview of the privilege is ap-
parent in court decisions concerning the issue of a communication's con-
fidentiality. The presumption that all marital communications are in-
tended to be confidential 3 results in the exclusion of statements which
were made without concern as to whether they were to be revealed
elsewhere. With no desire for secrecy to be satisfied, the privilege can-
not be said to encourage such communications; it is only those com-
munications which spouses wish to remain confidential which can be
to take in the part of criminality.... [L]et us secure to every man in the bosom
of his family, and in his own bosom, a safe accomplice: let us make every man's
house his castle; and convert that castle into a den of thieves.
5 J. BENTHAM, supra note 26, at 331.
" Comment, supra note 13, at 110; see, e.g., Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 56
F.R.D. 244 (1972); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE; UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE; C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 5, § 77.
7' See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (striking down the federal privi-
lege for anti-marital facts); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (admitting evidence
despite applicable state exclusionary rule when the state interest in such rules is out-
weighed by the infringement of the criminal defendant's due process rights); Patterson v.
State, 263 Ind. 55, 324 N.E.2d 482 (1972) (overturning the rule that prior inconsistent state-
ments of a witness are not admissible as substantive evidence); ef. United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1977) (refusing to establish a Presidential privilege); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972) (refusing to create a constitutional reporter's privilege).
7' 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
9 Id at 710.
Compare Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 505, 56 F.R.D. 244 (1972) (limiting the
marital privilege to only that for anti-marital facts in criminal cases) with FED. R. EVID. 501
(privileges to be determined by the applicable federal common law or state law).
The privilege for anti-marital facts, however, has not fared as well as the communication
privilege. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (striking down the federal
privilege for anti-marital facts).
'I See, e.g., Shepherd v. State, 257 Ind. 229, 277 N.E.2d 165 (1971) (rejecting state's argu-
ment that information acquired as a result of an accomplice relationship between husband
and wife should not be considered marital communications). See generally note 74 supra.
See notes 83-91 & accompanying text infra.
See notes 47-53 & accompanying text supra.
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said to be encouraged by the privilege. 4 Thus, rather than promoting
marital confidences, the presumption merely serves to avoid difficult
questions of intent concerning marital communications. 5 The courts,
however, regularly deal with such issues of intent and state of mind in
the context of other privileges8 and in other areas of the law.
Although such determinations take time, the costs are outweighed by
the vital need for relevant evidence in litigation.
In addition to the courts' unwarranted enlargement of the privilege
by means of the presumption of confidentiality, the scope of the marital
communication privilege has been extended unnecessarily to include
noncommunicative acts.8 This torturing of the term "communication"
has been defended as necessary because of the propinquity of the
marital relationship.89 A marriage is such, it is argued, that information
is acquired with no intent to communicate." Although this is undoubtedly
true, if there is no intent to communicate there cannot be said to have
been a decision on the part of the "communicating" spouse which could
have been influenced by the privilege."'
Criticism of judicial expansion of the marital communication privilege
has been focused primarily on the fact that such expansion does not fur-
ther the policy of strengthening marriages by means of increased com-
" See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2336.
"[T]he moment confidence ceases, privilege ceases .... Parkhurst v. Lowten, 2 Swanst.
194, 216, 36 Eng. Rep. 689, 596 (1819) (Lord Eldon, L.C.); accord, Blau v. United States, 340
U.S. 332, 335 (1951) (Minton, J., dissenting).
An example of this may be seen in Sexton v. Sexton, 129 Iowa 487, 105 N.W. 314
(1905). After spending several pages explaining that "marital communications," as pro-
tected by the Iowa statute, referred only to confidences, and that to expand the privilege's
scope any further would not advance the policy of the privilege, the court said:
It may be confessed that what are marital communications cannot be an-
swered according to any fixed rule. The varying circumstances of married life
are such that the question must be made to depend for its answer upon the
peculiar circumstances of the case out of which it arises. Perhaps no better
guide for general observance can be found than to say that impliedly all com-
munications between husband and wife are confidential in character, and
hence privileged.
Id. at 494, 105 N.W. at 317.
" The attorney-client privilege, for example, does not presume confidentiality merely
because of the relationship. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 91; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note
4, § 2311. Rather, the circumstances must show that the communication was the sort in-
tended to be confidential. Id.
" See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (tort; public official re-
quired to show actual malice before recovering damages for libel); Barnes v. State, 352 A.2d
409 (Del. 1976) (determining whether declarant actually believed that he was dying before
his statement could qualify as a dying declaration).
See notes 40-47 & accompanying text supra.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2336; Note, supra note 13, at 221.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2336.
" See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 80; R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHOTHERAPY, CONFIDEN-
TIALITY AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS 3 (1966); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2337; cf. id.
§ 2306 (discussing the attorney-client privilege).
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munication between spouses. Although such critiques assume that the
underlying rationale of the privilege is realistic, a close study of the
privilege indicates that it does not achieve its purported purpose and,
consequently, needlessly excludes evidence which should be admitted
even when limited to its narrowest scope.
The test most frequently utilized by both courts92 and commentators
3
to determine the validity of both new and existing communication
privileges was developed by Dean Wigmore. 4 In order for any privilege
to pass the Wigmore test, it must satisfy all of the following re-
quirements:
1) The communication must originate in a confidence that they [sic]
will not be disclosed.
2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered.
4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for
the correct disposal of the litigation. 5
The marital communication privilege, however, fails to satisfy two of
these elements. The privilege, as set forth in most statutes, expressly or
impliedly requires confidentiality at the time of the communication,96
and thus satisfies the first requirement. Nevertheless, the courts, by
means of the presumption that all marital communication are confiden-
tial, have caused the privilege in practice to cease to meet that require-
ment. 7
The second and third requirements of the Wigmore test are arguably
satisfied by the privilege. Although some sociologists 9 and legal com-
mentators99 have questioned the need for confidentiality, the marital
2 See, e.g., Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976); State v. Bixby, 27 Wash. 2d 144,
177 P.2d 689 (1947); State v. Driscoll, 53 Wis. 2d 699, 193 N.W.2d 851 (1972).
" See, e.g., R. SLOVENKO, supra note 91, at 39-50; Coburn, Child-Parent Communications:
Spare the Privilege and Spoil the Child, 74 DICK. L. REV. 599, 622-32 (1970); Fisher, supra
note 11, at 611-12; Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6
WAYNE L. REV. 175, 184-94 (1960); Quick, Privileges Under the Uniform Rules of Evidence,
26 U. CIN. L. REV. 537, 538-39 (1957).
" See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2285.
'5 Id.
See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
See notes 83-87 & accompanying text supra.
"See J. CUBER & P. HARROFF, THE SIGNIFICANT AMERICANS (1965); A. SKOLNICK, supra
note 19, at 236-70.
"See, e.g., Hines, Privileged Testimony of Husband and Wife in California, 19 CALIF.
L. REV. 390, 411 (1931); Comment, supra note 4, at 781. As early as 1882, the lessening of the
need for confidentiality in marriage was suggested: "By the modern enlargement of the
wife's separate contract and property relations . . . the spouses are presented, not so con-
stantly as partakers of one another's confidence, but rather as persons having adverse in-
terests to maintain .... 1 J. SCHOULER, supra note 32, § 71.
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relationship is undeniably intimate. ' The third element also may be
considered satisfied because, despite the increasing social acceptance of
divorce ' and criticism of the traditional marriage,' 2 it is still one of the
most respected relationships in our society.0 3
The final criterion of the Wigmore test, requiring that the injury to
the relationship from disclosure outweigh the benefit to society from
the correct disposal of litigation, is one which even some supporters of
the marital communication privilege have thought might not be
satisfied."" The contention that couples will be encouraged to confide in
one another by such a privilege is speculative and little data has been
offered in support of the assertion. °5 Indeed, the proponents of the
privilege have contended that it is up to the detractors to prove that
there is no causal link between the privilege and increased marital con-
fidences."'
Responding to that challenge, the critics argue that marital com-
munications are not made in contemplation of litigation and, consequently,
will not be influenced by evidentiary rules."' This is particularly evident
when one considers the infrequency with which couples become involved
in litigation.'' In addition, those classes of litigation in which marital
communications are most likely to be relevant, interspousal suits,"' are
already outside the privilege's purview. '
Another consideration casting doubt on the efficacy of the privilege in
fostering confidences is that few couples are aware of the marital com-
munication privilege:"' Unlike other relationships protected by similar
"' See E. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 1963) (delineating the intimacy model
of marriage); A. SKOLNICK, supra note 18, at 3-4 (describing the family as the most intimate
institution in American society).
"' See W. GOODE, WORLD REVOLUTION IN FAMILY PATTERNS 81 (1963); Weitzman, Legal
Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1203 (1974).
-0 See A. SKOLNICK, supra note 18, at 194-206.
Mll Note, supra note 13, at 218.
104 See, e.g., 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2332; Rothstein, supra note 23, at 131.
Wigmore considered the first three elements so well satisfied by the marital communication
privilege as to justify its retention despite doubts as to its satisfaction of the final require-
ment. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2332.
101 Hines, supra note 99, at 412-13; Morgan, supra note 1, at 150.
'0 See, e.g., Reutlinger, supra note 11, at 1391 ("If the burden against it is not clearly car-
ried, the privilege should prevail.").
"o, See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 86; Comment, supra note 19, at 319; Com-
ment, Posthumous Privilege in California, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 606, 609 (1961).
.0 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 86; see Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 25, at 682;
Comment, supra note 19, at 319.
'" Such suits often concern incidents to which there was only one witness-one of the
spouses. It was for this reason that the necessity exception was created. See 1 W. BLACK-
STONE, supra note 7, *443-44.
,,I See notes 69-70, 73 & accompanying text supra.
... Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 505, Advisory Committee Note, 56 F.R.D. 244, 246
(1972); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 86, n.90; Hines, supra note 99, at 413; Hutchins &
Slesinger, supra note 25, at 682; Comment, supra note 19, at 322.
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privileges, the marital relationship is not one into which the parties
have entered with the guarantee of confidentiality as an inducement;112
nor is it one in which one party is likely to inform the other of the
privilege."'
It is also unrealistic to assume that the rules of evidence have any ef-
fect on intimate relationships and the confidences which they encom-
pass."' Marital confidences are a product of trust and affection;"'
without such sentiments, marital partners are unlikely to be persuaded
to confide in one another merely because the communications are inad-
missible at trial.1 6 Indeed, the marital communication privilege does not
ensure that the confidences will not be disclosed in situations other than
at trial; 7 unlike the professional communication privileges, the marital
privilege is not complemented by a code of ethics requiring that the
receiving spouse keep the information confidential.1 8
A final argument distinguishes the marital relation from other
similarly privileged relationships. The communication privileges, with
the sole exception of the marital privilege, apply to professional rela-
tionships, which are almost entirely verbal. 9 While such communica-
tions may be important to a marriage, there is a multitude of other fac-
tors which play important roles in the success of that relationship.
While the success of an attorney-client relationship may depend entirely
on the free flow of information, a marriage may be successful without
such ease of communication because of the existence of other factors.1 2
Thus, the effectiveness of the marital communication privilege in
strengthening marriages is conjectural at best, and, consequently, the
injury to the marital relation that would result from the abolition of the
privilege is speculative. In contrast, the damage to the judicial process
by continued exclusion of often vital evidence is manifest.1 2' Therefore,
"' Orfield, supra note 14, at 144; Comment, supra note 19, at 322.
" See Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 505, Advisory Committee Note, 56 F.R.D. 244,
246 (1972).
11 Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 25, at 681-82 ("If evidentiary rulings had social ef-
fects one would never write letters and would live in perpetual fear of some intruder hiding
under the bed or in the closet").
"' C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 86; Comment, supra note 19, at 319; Comment, supra
note 107, at 609.
' Comment, supra note 19, at 320.
II, At least one English court, however, has held that marital communications may not be
revealed to third parties without permission of the communicating spouse; to do so would
subject the revealing spouse to tort liability. See Argyll v. Argyll, [1967] 1 Ch. 302, 322-30.
11 See, e.g., A.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 4: "A Lawyer Should
Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client."
"' Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 505, Advisory Committee Note, 56 F.R.D. 244, 246
(1972).
Il See id.
Ill C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 86.
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the injury to the marital relationship from disclosure does not outweigh
the benefit to litigation; the fourth element of the Wigmore test is not
satisfied.
The continued survival of the privilege despite the contentions that it
does not achieve its stated purpose may be explained as mere sentiment
on the part of courts and legislatures. Professor McCormick attributed
the privilege's longevity solely to feelings of delicacy. 2 Such sen-
sibilities are evident in the argument that the privilege is necessary to
avoid the natural repugnance that society would feel witnessing a wife
compelled to testify concerning her husband's marital confidences. 1"
Referring to "those hallowed confidences inherent in, and inseparable
from, the marital status,"124 courts reveal their own feelings of propriety.
These sentiments may, in fact, provide a better excuse for the presump-
tion of confidentiality than merely avoiding difficult factual issues."
Courts may feel it indelicate to inquire into the content and purpose of
those "hallowed confidences" in order to make a finding of intent. While
such feelings may conform to present standards of courtesy, they have
no place in litigation: "The law ... does not proceed by sentiment, but
aims at justice .... This high and solemn duty of doing justice and of
establishing the truth is not to be obstructed by considerations of senti-
ment." 28
Feelings of delicacy that have no place in a system of evidence and
dubious assertions that the privilege ensures connubial bliss are the
sole justifications for the marital communication privilege. To erect a
rule of privilege on such feeble foundations neglects the central impor-
tance of evidence in the judicial system. "The need to develop all rele-
vant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehen-
sive."" The marital communication privilege needlessly obstructs the
development of such facts.
11 See id
', See text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
12 Mercer v. State, 40 Fla. 216, 226, 24 So. 154, 157 (1898).
1 See notes 83-87 & accompanying text supra. The feelings of delicacy held by the
courts might also explain the lack of an "in furtherance of a crime" exception; the courts
might consider it to be improper to inquire into the content of the communication in order
to determine if it were in furtherance of a crime. But see note 74 supra.
Such sentiment is also evident in statutes which define the holder of the marital com-
munication privilege as only the defendant in a criminal suit. See note 61 supra. If spouses
may only prevent the revelation of communications when one is a criminal defendant, the
scope of the privilege is so slight that even the greatest of supporters might question its ef-
fectiveness in encouraging marital confidences. Rather, the only possible justification for
such a limited privilege is that legislators find it somehow "indelicate" to convict a man on
his wife's testimony.
1' 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2228 (discussing the natural repugnance rationale as it
was used to support the anti-marital fact privilege).
12 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); see notes 1-4 & accompanying text
supra.
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THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND MARITAL CONFIDENCES:
"ONLY THE PENUMBRA KNOWS"
Despite the marital communication privilege's obstructive impact on
litigation and its lack of proven benefit to the marital relationship, its
abolition may not be feasible. Constitutional privacy rights may be in-
fringed if such action were taken. It is only after a full consideration of
the United States Supreme Court's traditional protection of the marital
relationship and the constitutional right of privacy's role in that protec-
tion that the possibility of abolition, or restructuring, of the privilege
may be evaluated.
The Right to Be Let Alone..8
The family was considered "the primordial social, political and
economic unit"' 1 by the common law of both England and the United
States.13" Despite these ancient roots, the right of the family to its
privacy and autonomy did not gain constitutional protection until the
beginning of this century. 3' In Meyer v. Nebraska,"' the Supreme Court
recognized the family as an autonomous unit entitled to protection from
undue state regulation." Using substantive due process analysis," the
Court found that parents have a fundamental right to determine the up-
bringing of their children without inordinate state interference."1
5
"I Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[The
framers of the Constitution] conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone
-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.") (emphasis
added).
'' Comment, supra note 9, at 1012.
13 Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations Aban-
doning Youth to Their 'Rights," 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 615; Comment, supra note 9, at
1012; Note, The Fundamental Right to Family Integrity and Its Role in New York Foster
Care Adjudication, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 63, 66-70 (1977).
"' The concept of privacy in its broadest sense is as old as the law itself, implicit "in the
concept of the individual" and his protection. Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 1410, 1419 (1974). The laws concerning trespassing, eavesdropping and "peeping toms"
further protected the privacy of the individual. Id. at 1420. Although the Supreme Court
recognized a right to privacy in the fourth and fifth amendments in Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), it was not until the seminal article, Warren & Brandeis, The Right
to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890), that the concept of privacy as a discrete right, pro-
tected in tort, emerged. Henkin, supra, at 1420; Comment, supra note 4, at 79 n.176.
23 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
In Meyer, the Supreme Court overturned a statute prohibiting the teaching of foreign
languages in elementary schools. The majority held that the statute violated both the
teachers' right to teach and the parents' right to choose to have their children instructed in
a foreign language. Id. at 400.
" See id. at 399. Substantive due process has been described as "the principle that a law
adversely affecting an individual's life, liberty, or property is invalid, even though offending
no specific constitutional prohibition, unless the law serves a legitimate governmental ob-
jective." Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent
Cases, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 417, 419 (1976).
11 262 U.S. at 399.
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Justice McReynolds, for the majority, determined that the liberty
guarantee of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause "denotes
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the in-
dividual ... to marry, establish a home and bring up children.
13 1
In the years following Meyer, the substantive due process doctrine
was discredited, especially in the economic area.3 ' Although that facet
of the doctrine which triggered heightened judicial scrutiny when per-
sonal rights were involved had never been expressly overturned," con-
tinued protection of family autonomy became clothed in equal protection
language.3 9 This reluctance to use substantive due process analysis
resulted in the practice of scrutinizing only legislation that impinged
upon the fundamental rights which were found in specific constitutional
guarantees.4 ' It was not until the delineation of the constitutional right
of privacy"' that the Court was able to free itself from the self-imposed
strictures of the previous thirty years.
11 Id; accord, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down a statute re-
quiring children to attend public schools, finding that the statute interfered with the liberty
of parents to direct the education of their children).
1" See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934). See also Justice Black's dissent in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), where he maintains that substantive due process has been "laid to ... rest once and
for all." Id. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting).
M1 Comment, supra note 9, at 1013; cf. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938) (suggesting that the presumption of constitutionality, enjoyed by legislation once
substantive due process was discredited, might not apply in certain areas). Some members
of the Court used substantive due process as a tool with which to enforce the specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights against the states, finding those guarantees to be "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the fourteenth amendment, becoming
valid as against the states." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled, Ben-
ton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1968); see Henkin, supra note 131, at 1418. Compare this
with the incorporation doctrine espoused by Justice Black in Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Henkin, supra note 131, at 1418; Emerson, Nine
Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REV. 219, 223-24 (1965); Kauper, Penumbras,
Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case,
64 MICH. L. REV. 235, 237-38 (1965).
"19 See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Although the holding of Skinner
was said by the Court to be based on equal protection considerations, the majority stated:
"We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."
Id at 541. This language is more suggestive of substantive due process analysis.
1,0 Henkin, supra note 131, at 1417. Nevertheless, the Court occasionally used an unde-
fined liberty, avoiding the term substantive due process, to find private rights not ex-
pressly provided for in the Bill of Rights. Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra. Constitutional
Character for an Expanded Law of Privacy?, 64 MICH. L. REv. 197, 200-01 (1965); Henkin,
supra note 131, at 1418.
.. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that there is a right of
privacy in the penumbras of several provisions of the Bill of Rights). See generally notes
142-58 & accompanying text infra.
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The Constitutional Right of Privacy
This right of privacy emerged as a recognized constitutional doctrine
in Griswold v. Connecticut."' Although many commentators considered
it merely a revival of the old substantive due process,"' Justice Douglas,
writing for the plurality, expressly rejected the suggestion that the
Supreme Court should revert back to such an analysis."' Rather, he
found a right of privacy in the penumbras of various provisions of the
Bill of Rights which reinforced specific guarantees "" and "[w]ithout
which ... the specific rights would be less secure.""'
Although Griswold did not expressly limit the right of privacy to the
marital relationship, 1 7 it did stress that the instant legislation in-
terfered with the most intimate aspect of a sacred relationship. " 8 In a
great flight of eloquence, Justice Douglas restated the Court's abiding
esteem for the marital relationship:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older
than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and in-
timate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that pro-
motes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living; not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is
an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior deci-
sions.149
This deference to the marriage relationship, and in turn to the family,
has continued in the post-Griswold era."5 Recent cases have protected
" 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Constitution has always been interpreted as protecting some
elements of privacy. Henkin, supra note 131, at 1420; see, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886). However, these elements had never before been interpreted as adding
up to a general right of privacy. Henkin, supra note 131, at 1420-21.
143 See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 570 (1978); Henkin, supra note 131,
at 1428 & n.78; Kauper, supra note 138, at 253; Perry, supra note 134, at 417.
"' See 381 U.S. at 482. But note that the Court reaffirmed the principle of Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 381 U.S.
at 482-83. Both cases used substantive due process analysis. See notes 132-36 & accompany-
ing text supra. See also 381 U.S. at 515-16 (Black, J., dissenting).
" 381 U.S. at 484-85.
,4 Id. at 482-83.
.. See id at 481-86. The Court cited cases dealing with rights of free speech on public
transportation, Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1951), the propriety of
wiretapping jail rooms, Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962), and health inspections of
homes, Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), as evidencing penumbral rights of privacy.
381 U.S. at 485.
"4 381 U.S. at 485-86 ("Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of the
marital bedrooms for telltale signs of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the no-
tions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.").
Id- at 486.
1W See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678 (1977); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S.
132 (1976); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
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decisions relating to marriage,15' procreation,"2 contraception,"' child-
rearing,1" divorce155 and family relationships, 6 although not always by
means of the privacy doctrine. 1 7 This trend has reinforced the concept
that there is a "private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter."'1 8
Despite this continued use of the right of privacy, the new doctrine
has done little to extend the right of the individual to "privacy" as that
word is commonly used.' Instead, the Supreme Court has utilized the
doctrine primarily to ensure autonomy in certain decisions and not to
protect against the revelation of private matters.165 Nevertheless, two
recent decisions 61 have indicated that the right of privacy does encom-
pass a right to confidentiality of private information in addition to the
well-established right to autonomy. These two aspects of the right of
privacy need to be considered to determine whether either will preclude
an abolition of the marital communication privilege.
205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
152 See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
" See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972).
1 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
" See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
" See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972).
" See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (equal protection); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (substantive due process); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (irrebuttable presumption as violation of due process); Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (free exercise of religion); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972) (procedural due process and equal protection); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(equal protection and right of privacy); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (pro-
cedural due process); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (equal protection and procedural
due process).
' Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
159 Henkin, supra note 131, at 1424-25; Comment, Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanc-
tuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 1447 (1976). In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976), Justice Rehnquist expressed the majority's reluctance to add anything more than a
right to autonomy in decision making:
His claim is based not upon any challenge to the State's ability to restrict his
freedom of action in a sphere intended to be "private," but instead on a claim
that the state may not publicize .... None of our substantive privacy deci-
sions hold this or anything like this, and we decline to enlarge them in this
manner.
Id. at 713.
Henkin, supra note 131, at 1424-25; see notes 150-58 & accompanying text supra.
"e Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589 (1977).
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The Right to Autonomy
Before an interest may be protected under the autonomy branch of
the right of privacy, it must be "deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.'"162 The Supreme Court has held that such
fundamental interests include "activities relating to marriage, procrea-
tion, contraception, family relationships and child rearing and
education." ' 3 Taken together, this indicates a general right to autonomy
which necessarily encompasses marital communications, for without
such communications those protected decisions could not be made.
Nevertheless, to say that marital communications are included in this
branch of privacy does not necessarily mean that compelling the revela-
tion of such communications would violate the Constitution. Before such
a conclusion is possible, it must be established that the absence of a
marital communication privilege would result in a direct and grievous
burden being placed on marital communications. '64
This prerequisite of a direct burden was the deciding factor in Branz-
burg v. Hayes65 where a reporter contended that the state could not
compel him to reveal his sources without violating the freedom of the
press.'66 The Supreme Court concluded that, although the right of the
state to compel disclosure of sources did burden the press, such a
burden was merely indirect and speculative. 67 In order for a statute of
general applicability to violate the freedom of the press, the majority
reasoned, the burden must be more than incidental.'6 8
A showing of the requisite direct burden on marital communications
is difficult. Confidences between spouses would not be prohibited nor
necessarily inhibited, if the marital communication privilege were to be
abolished in any jurisdiction. 69 The Supreme Court could easily deter-
182 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
I'd. at 152-53.
"' Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1979) (stating that "a sufficiently grievous threat [is
necessary] ... to establish a constitutional violation"); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
693-94 (1972) (incidental and speculative burdens insufficient to establish a violation of free-
dom of the press); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1131-32 & n.19 (5th Cir. 1978) (familial
privacy not sufficiently burdened by secondary effects). Compare Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374 (1978) (direct burden on right to marry violates equal protection) with Califano v.
Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977) (indirect burden on right to marry allowed to stand).
' 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
" Id. at 679-80. Branzburg did not contend that this should be an absolute privilege.
Rather, he contended that the following three prerequisites should be satisfied before com-
pelling a newsman to disclose his sources: 1) that there be sufficient grounds to believe the
reporter has evidence relevant to the investigation; 2) that the information not be available
from other sources; and 3) that the need for the information be sufficiently compelling to
override first amendment concerns. Id. at 680.
"6 Id at 693-94.
Id. at 693-95.
"' See notes 105-15 & accompanying text supra.
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mine that the burden on marital communications is no less speculative
than the burden that was imposed on the press in the Branzburg case.7"
A second reason this branch of the right of privacy is unsuitable to
support a constitutional demand for a marital communication privilege
is that the autonomy branch, by definition, protects decisions. Although
it might be argued that the right to autonomy should protect the deci-
sion to communicate, the lack of a marital communication privilege
does not impose direct restrictions or sanctions on the decision to com-
municate; it merely adds another factor, the possibility of courtroom
disclosure, to be considered.
The Right to Confidentiality
Whatever fundamental right there may be to privacy of marital com-
munications is best protected by the confidentiality branch of the right
of privacy. The Supreme Court has.dealt with this aspect of the right of
privacy only twice. 1 An examination of both these cases will show to
what extent the right to confidentiality mandates a marital communica-
tion privilege.
Whalen v. Roe' was the first case in which the Supreme Court
recognized a right to confidentiality."' The appellees in that case con-
tended that their right of privacy had been violated by a New York
statute that required doctors to file with the state the names of patients
who had been given prescriptions for certain narcotic drugs.7 4 The ma-
jority noted that there was included in the right of privacy an "in-
dividual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters."'7' Never-
17 The reporter's privilege would seem more likely to encourage reporter-informant com-
munications than the marital communication privilege does marital communications for
several reasons: first, the informant may be induced into such a role by the privilege, 408
U.S. at 693, while a wife is not induced to marry because of the privilege, see text accompa-
nying note 112 supra; second, while affection and trust might prompt confidences between
spouses, see text accompanying notes 115-16 supra, informants may not have had previous
dealings with a reporter from which to acquire a certain amount of trust, and, as a result,
this arm's length dealing may require a privilege to provide the necessary security for the
informant; and third, the reporter will be able to advise the informant of the privilege,
unlike spouses, see text accompanying note 113 supra.
171 See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589 (1977).
" 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
's Id at 598-600. The majority quoted a commentator's suggestion that there were three
aspects of privacy: the right to be free from government surveillance; the right not to have
the government disclose private matters; and the right to be free to make certain decisions.
Id. at 599 n.24 (quoting Kurland, The PrivateI, U. CHI. MAGAZINE, Autumn, 1976, at 8). The
majority suggested that the first interest was protected by the fourth amendment, 429 U.S.
at 599 n.24, while the second two were protected by the right of privacy, id at 598-600.
Thus, the Supreme Court appears to view the confidentiality strand of privacy as distinct
from the fourth amendment's search and seizure provision.
'7' 429 U.S. at 598-600.
175 Id at 599.
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theless, the Court found that the potential for public disclosure of the in-
formation under this statute was so slight that the appellees' rights had
not been violated.
Both of the concurring opinions are enlightening. Although the ma-
jority did not find it necessary to discuss what type of test would be
used in this branch of privacy,177 Justice Brennan's concurrence contended
that had there been a substantial threat of disclosure, the state would
have been required to demonstrate that the statute was a necessary
means to promote a compelling state interest. 17 Justice Stewart, on the
other hand, argued that if there were an interest in confidentiality, that
interest would only protect matters concerning marriage, the home or
the right to use contraceptives.' Read together, they suggest that the
Supreme Court might have a different attitude towards any attempt to
deny a marital communication privilege.
In the second case which considered this aspect of the right of
privacy, Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,8 ° the majority did
apply a balancing test. Characterizing the public interest in the revela-
tion of the President's documents and tapes as "important," the Court
found that the individual interest in preserving the confidentiality of
the material, some of which concerned private discussions within the
President's family, was outweighed by the information's value to the
public. 8 ' Justice Brennan's majority opinion, however, continually
stressed the precautions that were to be taken to prevent disclosure of
any facts that were irrelevant or of a private nature.182 In addition, he
emphasized that the bulk of the information was material for which the
President had had no expectation of privacy."
Although neither the claimant in Whalen nor the claimant in Nixon
succeeded in obtaining protection for the information involved, asser-
tions that the interest in confidentiality is not as great as the interest in
autonomy" ' are premature. The cases may be explained as concerning
only indirect burdens on the right to confidentiality. The likelihood of
disclosure of private matters in both cases was slight; both statutes had
safeguards which were carefully constructed to protect the privacy of
17s Id at 600-02.
"7 Having found the possibility of disclosure so remote, the majority found no need to
determine the appropriate test for this type of disclosure of -private matters. Id. at 606
(Brennan, J., concurring); see id. at 600 (majority opinion).
1 Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring).
"7 Id. at 608-09 (Stewart, J., concurring).
"s 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
Id. at 465.
18 Id. at 462.
18 Id at 459.
"7 E.g., Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978); Comment, supra note 9, at
1015.
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the individuals involved. With no imminent threat of disclosure, there
was no direct burden on privacy interests and thus no need to apply
strict scrutiny. A challenge to the denial of a marital communication
privilege would, however, involve a direct burden on the privacy of
marital confidences. While Nixon and Whalen dealt only with the slight
possibility that private information would be disclosed, the denial of the
marital communication privilege by a court and its subsequent order
that a wife reveal her spouse's confidences would have the same effect
as an actual disclosure of private information by the state 185- an action
which Justice Brennan suggested would be subject to strict scrutiny.188
In addition to the fact that not having a marital communication
privilege would place a direct burden on the right to confidentiality, the
traditional deference of the Court to the marital relationship' might
also prompt more stringent consideration. As this concern for the
marital institution has resulted in protection of activities relating to
marriage by means of autonomy analysis,' the Supreme Court might
provide similar protection for the confidentiality of such activities.
The direct burden on marital privacy and the traditional solicitude for
the institution of marriage indicate that the Supreme Court would apply
strict scrutiny to a state's action in compelling the disclosure of marital
confidences. Such a test demands that the state show a compelling in-
terest which is promoted by such action89 and that the chosen method of
furthering that interest be necessary, and not merely rationally related
to, the state interest. 98 Whether such a compelling interest exists in the
development of all relevant facts in judicial proceedings has been ques-
tioned by at least one court.'91 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
characterized the need for evidence as fundamental to the criminal
justice system. 9' In addition, the Court indicated in Branzburg v. Hayes
that the state interest in criminal investigation was sufficiently compel-
ling to satisfy such a test. 9' Whether the state has a similarly compel-
"' In confidentiality analysis there is less difficulty with the direct/indirect dichotomy
than that involved in the autonomy branch. See text accompanying notes 162-70 supra. In
the latter branch, the inquiry is concerned with how the state action affects the protected
decision. Id. However, in the confidentiality branch of privacy, the act of disclosure directly
destroys the privacy.
1 See text accompanying note 178 supra.
I See text accompanying notes 129-58 supra.
1 See text accompanying notes 151-56 supra.
8 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977).
190 Id
... See In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 433-35, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380-81 (1978) (holding that
the interest in fostering child-parent communication outweighed the "legitimate" state in-
terest in litigation).
" United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
408 U.S. at 700-01 (suggesting in dictum that the interest in "extirpating the traffic in
illegal drugs, in forestalling assassination attempts on the President, and in preventing...
violent disorder . . ." was compelling).
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ling interest in the ascertainment of truth in civil litigation is unclear,
but the cases have indicated that it may not.194
Having established its overriding interest in the disclosure of rele-
vant evidence in criminal cases, the state must proceed to demonstrate
that the denial of the marital communication privilege is necessary to
promote that interest.195 The need for such evidence may vary from case
to case depending on factors such as the possibility of obtaining
equivalent evidence from other sources and how essential such evidence
is to either the defense or prosectuion.198 Having determined that a
limited marital communication privilege is constitutionally mandated,
the Court will need an outline for the privilege.
THE NEW PRIVILEGE
The delineation of the constitutional marital communication privilege
involves a balancing of the central need for evidence against the right to
marital confidentiality. Both concepts have been widely recognized.1"
This balancing between two such important interests could result in the
formulation of a privilege that is carefully tailored to exclude only that
evidence which is necessarily constitutionally protected. In order to
keep the disruption to litigation at a minimum, an inquiry must be made
into what confidences are so integral to the marital relationship as to re-
quire constitutional protection.
In dealing with the marital relationship and the right of privacy, the
Supreme Court has continually referred to the "intimacies"199 or "in-
In addition to the state's interest in the search for truth in criminal cases, the due proc-
ess right of the criminal defendant to present a defense must be considered. Regardless of
the state's interest, a criminal defendant might be able to force revelation of privileged
marital communications. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (the right of
the defendant to present, confront and cross-examine witnesses is "essential to due
process"); cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712-13 (1977) (the allowance of a Presi-
dential privilege to protect the President's general need for evidence in disregard of the
"specific and central" need for evidence in criminal trials "would cut deeply into the guar-
antee of due process of law").
'" Comment, supra note 4, at 801; cf United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974)
(stressing the need for evidence in criminal trials); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-88
(1972) (referring only to the need for evidence in grand jury proceedings); id. at 710 n.*
(Powell, J., concurring) (justifying the denial of a reporter's privilege by comparing it to the
"essential societal interest in the detection and prosecution of crime"); McMann v. SEC, 87
F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1937) (Learned Hand, J.) ("The suppression of truth is a grievous
necessity at best, more especially when as here the inquiry concerns the public interest ....
[W]hen the proposed disclosure is not for a public purpose, courts have frequently for-
bidden the betrayal of information ...").
'" See text accompanying note 190 supra.
" Comment, supra note 4, at 802; see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 77.
" See text accompanying notes 1-4, 129-56, 192-94 supra.
IN Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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timate relation[s]"'99 of husband and wife. When the right of privacy was
the sole grounds for invalidating legislation, the decisions concerned
abortion and contraception."' This suggests that only the most intimate
communications between husband and wife may be constitutionally inac-
cessible and therefore protected from revelation. Such intimate com-
munications would probably include those concerning sexuality and af-
fectional statements.20'
The intimacies to be protected would no longer be limited to
statements or acts that are intended to convey a message. 212 Because the
purpose of the constitutional privilege would be to protect the privacy
of marital intimacies-not to encourage marital communications'-the
scope of the privilege should include actions irrespective of their infor-
mational content.
Whether such intimate acts and communications are excluded by the
constitutional privilege will depend on the need which the offering
party has for the information. 24 Although such a need varies according
to the individual case,05 the Supreme Court may try to enunciate a
general rule that the communications that are to be admitted must be
necessary to establish an essential element of the defense or prosecu-
tion and be available from no other source. 26 Although this may exclude
cumulative evidence essential to the persuasiveness of the case, the
alternative would be to embroil the courts in countless appeals concern-
ing the degree to which the evidence must be needed before disclosure
may constitutionally be required.0 '
19 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (contraception); Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)
(abortion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (contraception); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception).
221 This limitation would be in keeping with the marital relationship as it exists today. No
longer is it a unit held together by the multitude of functions it performed in the past. See
A. SKOLNICK, supra note 18, at 84-108; B. YORBURG, THE CHANGING FAMILY 114-19 (1973).
Hutchins and Slesinger suggest that the economic production function of the family was the
true reason for the marital privileges. Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 25, at 677. Today,
they argue, the typical marriage is cemented by affection and sexuality only.
See generally notes 40-46 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 36-37 & accompanying text supra.
224 Without this need, the method of acquiring the evidence-denying the marital com-
munication privilege-is not "necessary" to the promotion of the state interest in facilitat-
ing the search for truth. See text accompanying notes 189-90 supra.
222 See text accompanying note 196 supra.
See Comment, supra note 4, at 802; cf. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 77, at 159-60
(suggesting the decision to grant a privilege in a specific case be made by balancing the
needs of the litigants with the privacy interests at stake).
I The Court is unlikely to use a balancing test only, with its attendant uncertainties and
appeals; it would be "unwilling to embark the judiciary on a long and difficult journey to
such an uncertain destination." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703 (1972). See generally
id at 701-05.
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CONCLUSION
The marital communication privilege as it exists in most jurisdictions
is an ineffective attempt to promote marital harmony. The only function
that it serves is to obstruct the search for truth. Right of privacy con-
siderations, nevertheless, preclude the complete abolition of the marital
communication privilege. The right of married couples to privacy in
their intimate communications and activities is constitutionally pro-
tected.
This note has outlined a formulation of the marital communication
privilege which comports with the constitutional privacy requirements.
Its essential characteristics include limited applicability in criminal
cases, coverage of only sexual or affectional communications and acts,
and a requirement that the evidence sought be both necessary to an
essential element of the case and unavailable from any other' source
before the privilege is ruled inapplicable. Such a privilege would pro-
vide the necessary protection of privacy interests while giving adequate
consideration to the need for evidence in an adversary system of justice.
ANNE N. DEPREZ
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